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DETERMINING THE WISHES OF THE
INCOMPETENT: CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR,
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
A competent individual's right to refuse medical treatment stems
from the common law1 rooted in the United States Constitution's four-
teenth amendment.2 Recently, courts have recognized a general right
for all persons, including incompetent patients, to refuse medical treat-
ment.? While acknowledging the incompetents' rights, state courts4
face the difficult question of how to determine the "best interests" of
those patients who cannot choose for themselves.5 In Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health,6 the United States Supreme Court
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041 (1990) (forcible injection
of medication into a nonconsenting mentally ill state prisoner represents a substantial
interference with that person's liberty); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (pris-
oner transferred to mental hospital not subject to involuntary psychiatric treatment
without due process protections); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (children,
like adults, have a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
medical treatment); cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (state's
interest in preventing disease outweighed an individual's liberty interest in declining
smallpox vaccination).
2. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No... State shall de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.. ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. At least four Supreme Court Justices believe that no federal con-
stitutional rights are implicated by the "right to die" cases. Mayo, Constitutionalizing
the "Right to Die", 49 MD. L. REv., 103, 106 (1990). See infra notes 26-34 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of states that base the right to refuse treatment on the
constitutional right of privacy.
3. See, eg., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 427 (1977) (the court permitted the withholding of chemotherapy from
a 67-year-old mentally retarded man suffering from leukemia).
4. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 732, 370 N.E.2d at 431. In Saikewicz the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used a "substituted judgment doctrine" in
which both the guardian and the judge attempted to ascertain what the incompetent
person would have decided if able to make a decision. Id.
5. See infra notes 26-59 and accompanying text for discussion of procedures other
states use to ascertain the wishes of an incompetent patient.
6. 110S. Ct. 2841 (1990). Cruzan is an incompetent living in a Missouri state hos-
pital. Id. at 2845.
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held that the Constitution does not preclude the State of Missouri from
instituting a strict evidentiary standard when determining an incompe-
tent's wishes to withdraw life sustaining treatment.7
In January, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan sustained severe injuries after
her car overturned.8 Upon arrival at a hospital, an attending neurosur-
geon diagnosed her as having endured probable cerebral contusions
compounded by significant anoxia.9 Cruzan remained comatose for
several weeks and then progressed to a state of unconsciousness.' °
Cruzan's husband allowed the surgeons to implant a gastrostomy feed-
ing and hydration tube in order to ease feeding and further her recov-
ery. 1 Because all rehabilitative efforts have failed, Cruzan remains in
a "persistent vegetative state."' 2 While she is not dead or terminally
ill, little hope for improvement exists and medical experts testify that
Cruzan could live another thirty years.13
After employees of the hospital refused to remove the nutrition and
hydration tube without court approval, Cruzan's parents received au-
thorization from a state trial court to have the life-sustaining equip-
ment withdrawn.14 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri
7. Id. at 2854. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text for additional discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's rationale for deferring to Missouri's high evidentiary stan-
dards when determining the wishes of an incompetent.
8. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845. Paramedics restored Cruzan's breathing and heart-
beat at the accident site. Id.
9. Id. Anoxia results from the deprivation of oxygen. Id. The Missouri trial court
found that permanent brain damage generally occurs after six minutes in an anoxic
state. Id. Cruzan was deprived of oxygen for approximately 12 to 14 minutes. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. A persistent vegetative state (PVS) is defined as the "irreversible cessation
of cognitive or higher functions of the brain stem. Patients may appear awake and may
even have visual tracking movements. They go through sleep and wake cycles and may
have facial grimaces and yawning. However, they fail to have any conscious interaction
with their environment." Johnson, Withholding Fluids and Nutrition: Identifying the
Populations at Risk, 2 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 189, 195 (1986).
13. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845 n.1. Nancy Cruzan's highest cognitive brain func-
tion consists of grimacing in response to painful stimuli, and her arms and legs are
contracted with irreversible muscle and tendon damage. Id.
14. Id. at 2846. The trial court cited two reasons for its decision: (1) a person in
Cruzan's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions
to refuse or direct the'withdrawal of "death prolonging procedures"; and (2) Cruzan
expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in a somewhat serious conversation with a friend
that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at
least halfway normally. That conversation suggests that given her present condition she
would not wish to continue with her nutrition and hydration. Id.
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reversed by a divided vote.15 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed in a 5-4 decision 6 holding that the United States Constitution
permits Missouri to apply a clear and convincing standard for evidence
of an incompetent's desire to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 7
The common law doctrine of informed consent"8 developed from the
principle that a battery occurs when a physician performs a medical
procedure without the consent of the patient."' The logical corollary
to informed consent is the patient's right to refuse treatment.20 In the
last twenty years, courts have adopted the belief that competent adults
have the right to refuse any kind of medical treatment, even if treat-
ment could prolong the patient's life.21
Most of the refusal of treatment cases prior to 1976 involved patients
who refused blood transfusions forbidden by their religious beliefs.22
Of those courts allowing medical treatment over the patient's objec-
tion, 3 only two have looked at the state's interest in preserving human
15. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 408-09 (Mo. 1988) (en bane). Judge Rob-
ertson wrote the majority opinion for the court. Chief Judge Billings, Judge Rendlen,
and Special Judge Reinhard concurred. Judges Blackmar, Higgins, and Welliver filed
dissenting opinions.
16. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion. Justices O'Connor and
Scalia filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting
opinion.
17. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1990).
18. See, eg., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186
(1958) (doctor severed patient's spermatic cords when consent was given only for an
exploratory examination).
19. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417 (quoting Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 676
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983)). Justice, then Judge, Cardozo described informed consent as fol-
lows: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at 2847
(quoting Schloendortf v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914)).
20. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417. "If one can consent to treatment, one can also
refuse it." Id.
21. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1363 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
limits of government control over medical treatment decisions).
22. Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan,
50 OHIo ST. L.J. 891, 894-95 (1989).
23. For cases where patient refuses lifesaving blood transfusion on religious
grounds, but court allows treatment to be administered, see, Application of President
and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F.
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life.24 With the advance of medical technology, however, the cases in-
volving the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment have increased
steadily.25
The landmark case evaluating the right to refuse medical treatment
is In re Quinlan.26 In Quinlan, Karen Quinlan's parents sought to
have the respirator that assisted her breathing removed; Quinlan, like
Cruzan, persisted in a vegetative state.27 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey found the constitutional right to privacy sufficiently broad to
encompass a person's right to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances.28 In making its determination, the court first examined
the strong state interest in the preservation and sanctity of human
life.29 Next, the court explained that the state's interest grows weaker
and the patient's right to privacy grows stronger "as the degree of bod-
ily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."30 Devising a proce-
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964). See also Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (civil rights action for unauthorized blood transfusion); Annotation, Power of
Courts or Other Public Agencies, in the Absence of Statutory Authority, to Order Compul-
sory Medical Care for Adult, 9 A.L.R. 3d 1391 (1966).
24. Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1008-09 (suicide is essentially analogous to the
refusal of medical treatment in the eyes of the state); Heston, 58 N.J. at 581-82, 279
A.2d at 672-73 (court finds no difference between passively submitting to death and
actively seeking it).
25. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (discussing 54
reported decisions from 1976-88).
26. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). At the request of
her parents, the court permitted the removal of a respirator believed to have been keep-
ing Karen Quinlan alive. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
27. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655. See supra note 12 for the definition of a persistent
vegetative state. Unlike Quinlan, Cruzan does not depend on a respirator for breathing.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2841, 2845 (1990).
28. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court described the constitutional
right to privacy as broad enough to encompass refusal of medical treatment in much the
same way it is used in a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy. Id. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding state abortion law unconstitutional based on the
right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding state law for-
bidding use of contraceptives unconstitutional based on the right to privacy).
29. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court further discussed the state's
interest in defending the physician's right to administer medical treatment according to
his best judgment. Id. at 41-51, 355 A.2d 664-69.
30. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court further declared that eventually the indi-
vidual's rights will overcome the state's interest. Id. Because the degree of Quinlan's
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dure for Quinlan's family to assert the right to privacy on her behalf,3 '
the court permitted the family to render their best judgment of what
treatment Quinlan would choose if capable of making the decision.32
Accordingly, the court upheld the family's decision to remove the arti-
ficial life support.33 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court's explication
of the state's interest in the preservation of human life against the indi-
vidual's right to privacy represented a significant step in the develop-
ment of the law concerning the withdrawal of life support.34
In re Conroy35 afforded the New Jersey court an opportunity to
build upon the principles established in Quinlan. In Conroy, the court
decided whether to authorize the removal of a feeding tube from an 84-
year-old bedridden woman suffering from an organic brain syn-
drome.36 The court held that incompetent individuals retain their
right to refuse medical treatment and that such a right could be exer-
cised by a surrogate decision maker.37 Although acknowledging that a
bodily invasion was very great and her prognosis extremely poor, the court maintained
that her rights prevailed over the interests of the state. Id.
Cf. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977). In Saikewicz, the court surveyed case law from 1840 to 1977 and
distilled four state interests involving the refusal of medical treatment: (1) preserving
life, (2) protection of innocent third parties, (3) preventing suicide, and (4) maintaining
medical ethics. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. The state can assert an interest in the
preservation of life only when the patient is curable. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
31. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
32. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
33. Id.
34. One commentator noted, however, that Quinlan merely provided the "first
step" for a sweeping "judicial reorientation of values." Peters, The State's Interest in the
Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (1989).
35. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
36. Id. at 336, 486 A.2d at 1216-17. At the time of trial Ms. Conroy was also
unable to move, remained in a semi-fetal position, could not control her bowels, and
suffered from heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
On the other hand, she did interact with her environment by moving her head, her eyes
sometimes followed individuals in the room, and she smiled on occasion when others
combed her hair.
37. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229-30. The court set up two standards for the decision
maker to use: (1) a "subjective standard" when there is clear evidence that the incompe-
tent person would have exercised it, and (2) an "objective standard" for when such
evidence was lacking, including two variations of the "best interests" approach: (a) a
"limited-objective" test which allows surrogate decisionakers to expand on insufficient
evidence of the patient's wishes, and (b) "pure objective" test which allows surrogate
decisionmakers to make treatment decisions in the absence of any subjective evidence.
Id. at 362-67, 486 A.2d at 1230-32. Cf. supra note 4 discussing the approach to substi-
tuted judgment taken by the Saikewicz court.
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federal right of privacy might apply, the court based its decision on the
common law right of self-determination and informed consent.38 The
court reasoned that if the burden of pain and suffering outweighed any
pleasure derived from living, treatment could be terminated under a
"limited-objective" standard.3 9 Unlike prior refusal of treatment cases,
the Conroy analysis rejected distinctions' between artificial nutrition
and hydration and other forms of medical treatment.41
Following the Conroy common law rationale, the Supreme Court of
Illinois in In re Estate of Longeway 42 allowed the refusal of treatment
on the basis of the common law doctrine of informed consent. The
Longeway court extended the Conroy analysis by additionally relying
38. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223. Accord In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (court refused to base the "right to die" on
constitutional right to privacy, but instead chose informed consent doctrine); see also
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417(1977)
(court relied on both right to privacy and the right to informed consent in finding that
the state has no interest sufficient to counterbalance a patient's decision to decline life-
prolonging treatment); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(basing its argu-
ment upon liberty interests and rejecting the implied Constitutional right to privacy, the
Supreme Court refused to find the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy).
39. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. The court also reasoned that if
the life-sustaining treatment was clearly inhumane, a "pure-objective" standard could
be used to terminate treatment. Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232. Only when none of
the conditions are met did the court find that it was better to err in favor of preserving
life. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
40. The distinctions included: (1) the distinction between actively hastening death
by terminating treatment and passively allowing a person to die of a disease, (2) the
distinction between ordinary versus extraordinary care, (3) the distinction between
treating individuals initially versus withdrawing treatment later, and (4) the distinction
between treatment by artificial feeding versus other forms of life-sustaining medical pro-
cedures. Id. at 369-74, 486 A.2d at 1233-37.
41. Id. In three later cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the guide-
lines set up in Conroy are limited to elderly, incompetent patients with limited life ex-
pectancies. The New Jersey court established alternative approaches to deal with each
situation. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (37-year-old competent
mother with terminal illness had right to removal of respirator based on common law
and constitutional principles which override competing state interests); In re Peter, 108
N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (65-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state had
the right to removal of a feeding tube); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
In Jobes, a 31-year-old woman who remained in a persistent vegetative state was
allowed to have the feeding tube removed. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 395, 529 A.2d at 434.
Notably, the court declared the hearsay testimony regarding the patient's intent insuffi-
cient to meet the clear and convincing standard of evidence. Id. at 413, 529 A.2d at
443. Nevertheless, under Quinlan, family members are entitled to make a substituted
judgment. Id. at 415, 529 A.2d at 444.
42. 133 Ill.2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
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upon the provisions in the Illinois Probate Act.43 In Longeway, Bonnie
Keiner, the daughter and guardian of 76-year-old Dorothy Longeway
sought court permission to withdraw artificially administered nutrition
and hydration sustaining her mother.' The court held that the Illinois
Probate Act implies the right of a guardian to refuse artificial life sup-
port on behalf of the incompetent ward when the incompetent has been
diagnosed as terminally ill and irreversibly comatose.4 5 In reaching its
conclusion, the court applied guidelines to determine when the guard-
ian's right of refusal attaches: (1) identify what kind of patient is eli-
gible for surrogate exercise of the right to refuse artificial life support,4 7
(2) balance the patient's right to refuse medical treatment against the
state interest,4" (3) detail the procedure for ascertaining the patient's
wishes by employing the "substituted judgment" theory49 instead of
43. 133 Il.2d at 46, 549 N.E.2d at 297. The court found that the right to privacy in
the federal constitution was uncertain. Id.
44. Id. at 43, 549 N.E.2d at 293. Dorothy Longeway suffered a series of strokes
which rendered her incompetent. Id. Longeway had lost all personality, memory, pur-
poseful action, social interaction, thought and emotion, due to severe brain damage. Id.
Cf. McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 705, 553 A.2d
596, 603 (1989) (right to remove artificial feeding tubes in Connecticut Removal of Life
Support Systems Act).
45. Longeway, 133 Ill.2d at 46, 549 N.E.2d at 298. Section 1 la-17 of the Illinois
Probate Act outlines the powers of a guardian. The guardian can make provisions for
her ward's "support, care, comfort, health, education and maintenance." Id. (quoting
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 11 la-17 (1987)). The Act also permits a patient who
previously executed power of attorney under the Powers of Attorney for Health Care
Law (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 804-10 (1987)) to authorize her agent to terminate
the food and water that keep her alive. Id. The Probate Act expressly provides that the
guardian has "no power, duty or liability with respect to any.. .health care matters
covered by the agency." Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 1a-17(cX1987)).
The court reasoned that "if only an agent can terminate food and water under a power
of attorney, the Probate Act would not have precluded a guardian from interfering with
this prerogative, unless the guardian also would have this power." Id.
46. 133 Ill.2d at 47-53, 549 N.E.2d at 298-300.
47. Id. at 47-48 The court lists three requirements for the patient: (1) the patient
must be "terminally ill" as defined by the statute, (2) the patient "must be diagnosed as
irreversibly comatose, or in a persistently vegetative state", and (3) the patient's diagno-
sis must be confirmed by the attending physician and at least two other physicians. Id.
at 47-48, 549 N.E.2d at 298-99.
48. Id. at 48, 549 N.E.2d at 299. See supra notes 24-41 and infra notes 54-59 and
accompanying text for discussion of state interests versus individual right to refuse med-
ical treatment.
49. Longeway, 133 Ill.2d at 48-51, 549 N.E.2d at 299-300. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text for discussion of the "substituted judgment" theory.
The Longeway court found the "expressed intent" standard utilized in O'Connor too
rigid, and believed that other clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent could
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the "best interest" theory,"° and (4) determine the court's role."
Nonetheless, the court invited the legislature to "streamline, tailor, or
overrule" the aforementioned procedures.52 Until such time, however,
the Longeway guidelines must be followed for a guardian to exercise
the common law right to refuse life-sustaining treatment on the incom-
petent's behalf.53
Although Conroy and its progeny established a set of objective stan-
dards for instances where no clear evidence of the patient's wishes ex-
isted, the New York Court of Appeals in In re Westchester County
Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor (O'Connor),54 refused to accept any-
thing less than the patient's "expressed wishes."55 In O'Connor, Mary
be considered. Longeway, 133 Ill.2d at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 300. Nonetheless, Justice
Ward, dissenting, did not like the majority's "substituted judgment" standard and in-
stead would institute a "clear and convincing" standard. Id. at 63, 549 N.E.2d at 306
(Ward, J., dissenting). However, Justice Clark unequivocally declared that the court
should not resolve the right to die issue at all. Rather the legislature is the proper forum
for that determination. Id. at 65, 549 N.E.2d at 306 (Clark, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 48-49, 549 N.E.2d at 299. The "best interests" test enables the surrogate
decision maker to choose for the incompetent patient the medical procedures which
would be in the patient's best interest. Id. "Relief from suffering, preservation or resto-
ration of functioning, and quality and extent of sustained life" represent the criteria
used in the decision making process. Id. The court cited several cases applying the
"best interests" standard to surrogate decision-making on behalf of incompetent pa-
tients. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Conserva-
torship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958
(1988); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
51. Longeway, 133 Ill.2d 33, 51-52 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (1989). A court order is
not required by the majority of courts discussing this issue. Id. at 51 Nonetheless, the
Longeway court views judicial intervention proper in light of the nature of the decision.
Id. The court first reasons that the state presumption favoring life justifies judicial scru-
tiny. Id. Second, the court states that intervention protects against the slight chance of
greed tainting the surrogate's judgment. Id. Finally, the court's "parens patriae"
power protects the estate and the incompetent person. Id. at 52, 549 N.E.2d at 301.
52. Id. at 53
53. Id.
54. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988). Mary O'Connor
suffered from a series of strokes which left her severely debilitated. Id. at 523, 531
N.E.2d at 608-09, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. O'Connor was stuporous and virtually unre-
sponsive, but her physicians agreed that she was not unconscious or comatose. Id. at
524-25, 531 N.E.2d at 609-10, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. The doctors also agreed that
O'Connor sustained substantial and irreparable brain damage and that she would never
regain significant mental capacity. Id. at 525, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
O'Connor's daughters refused to give the hospital permission to insert a nasogastric
tube when their mother developed an inability to swallow. Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at
611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
55. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (Simons, J., dissenting). The
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O'Connor's daughters refused to give the hospital permission to insert
a nasogastric tube when their mother developed an inability to swal-
low.56 The O'Connor court declared it inconsistent with the funda-
mental commitment of the court that a person or court should decide
what an acceptable quality of life is for another human being.5 7 The
court held that the record lacked the requisite clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's expressed intent to withhold life-sustaining
treatment.58 While admitting that it had created a demanding stan-
dard and a rigorous burden of proof, the court deemed it appropriate
to err on the side of preserving life.59 Consequently, the O'Connor
court limited the decision to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment to
only those cases in which clear evidence of the patient's wishes was
established.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health ' presented the
United States Supreme Court its first opportunity to examine an in-
competent's right to refuse medical treatment under the United States
Constitution.61 In Cruzan v. Harmon,62 the Missouri Supreme Court
heightened evidentiary standard imposed by the majority in practical effect has denied
any possibility that an incompetent patient will be able to refuse unwanted medical
treatment. Id. at 539, 531 N.E.2d at 619, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 898. O'Connor's wishes
were clearly stated, but failed under the majority's clear and convincing standard be-
cause they were not sufficiently specific. Id. at 549, 531 N.E.2d at 624, 534 N.Y.S.2d at
903. Cf. Eichner ex rel. Fox v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266 (the New York Court of Appeals allowed the withdrawal of a respirator when
compelling proof was offered that a patient in a persistent vegetative state would have
wanted the life support removed), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
56. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
57. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-94. Cf, supra notes 4, 37
and accompanying text discussing different approaches toward substituted judgment.
58. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 530-34, 531 N.E.2d at 613-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-94.
The court noted that O'Connor had never specifically discussed the subject of nutrition
and hydration. Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890. When one of the
daughter's stated that she did not know what choice her mother would make, the court
found that there was no "clear and convincing" evidence on behalf of O'Connor in the
matter. Id. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (the court
implied that when there is a dispute between the physician and the family or among the
family about the treatment, the "clear and convincing" standard should be used).
59. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
60. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text for a de-
tailed outline of the facts.
61. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851. In Cruzan, the life sustaining treatment was artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration. Id. Many courts recognize a distinction between artificial
hydration and nutrition and other forms of medical treatment. This distinction often
arises from the perception that hydration and nutrition are actually food and water and
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established a heightened evidentiary standard when evaluating a pa-
tient's wishes for continuation of medical treatment.63 In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court determined that
whether Missouri's clear and convincing evidentiary standard falls
within the scope of the Constitution depends upon what interests the
state seeks to protect.64 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
determined that the state need not make a judgment about the "qual-
ity" of the individual's life, but simply can assert an unqualified interest
in the preservation of human life. 65 The Court further recognized that
because states demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homi-
cide as a serious crime, the state is not required to remain neutral in the
face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to
starve to death.66 Next, the Court applied a balancing test to deter-
mine if Missouri's unqualified interest in preserving human life out-
weighed Nancy Cruzan's liberty interest under the fourteenth
amendment.67 The majority held that the Constitution does not forbid
Missouri from establishing a "clear and convincing" standard to assure
therefore distinct from medical treatment. See In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill.2d 33,
40-42, 549 N.E.2d 292, 294-95 (1989). See supra notes 27-59 and accompanying text
for discussion of state court approaches to balancing state interests against individual's
right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment.
62. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane).
63. Id. While acknowledging that the right to refuse medical treatment via the in-
formed consent doctrine exists, the court did not apply it here because of the impossibil-
ity of an informed decision. Id. at 417. The court also refused to read the right to
privacy in the Missouri Constitution such that it would support the right of a person to
refuse medical treatment in every circumstance. Id. at 417. In discussing the state's
unconditional interest in prolonging life as embodied in the Missouri Living Will stat-
ute, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 459.010-459.055 (1986), the court found Cruzan's conversation
with her roommate regarding her wish not to continue life if sick or injured unreliable
for the purpose of determining her intent. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424. Moreover, the
court prohibited Nancy's parents from exercising "substituted judgment" on her behalf.
Id. at 426. The court stated that "[No person can assume that choice for an incompe-
tent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or
the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence absent here." Id. at 425.
64. 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53. The Court cited both In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987), and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text for application of clear and convincing
evidentiary standards.
65. 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
66. Id. at 2852.
67. Id. at 2855. See infra note 63 discussing the Court's finding that evidence did
not amount to "clear and convincing" proof of the patient's desire to refuse life-support
treatment.
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that the action of the surrogate decision maker conforms to the wishes
expressed by the patient while competent." The Court affirmed the
Supreme Court of Missouri's findings that the evidence uncovered at
trial did not amount to clear and convincing proof of the patient's de-
sire to have artificial hydration and nutrition withdrawn.69
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, accepted the majority's position that
an individual's liberty rights must be weighed against any state inter-
ests.70 However, he disagreed with the majority's opinion that Mis-
souri's interests outweighed those of Nancy Cruzan.71 While the right
to refuse medical treatment may not be absolute,72 Justice Brennan
stated that no state interest could outweigh the rights of someone in
Nancy Cruzan's position.73
68. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855. The Court noted that many courts have a "substi-
tuted judgment" standard that requires "clear and convincing" evidence. Id. at 2854-
55. See, eg., McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut Inc., 209 Conn. 692, -,
553 A.2d 596, 604-05 (1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 133 I1.2d 33, 51, 549 N.E.2d
292, 300 (1989); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407, 529 A.2d 434, 452-53 (1987).
69. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855. The Court found that Cruzan's statements made to
a housemate a year before her accident indicating that she would rather die than live as
a "vegetable" did not apply to the cessation of medical treatment or of hydration and
nutrition. Id.
Justices O'Connor and Scalia filed concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor noted that
the Court was not deciding whether the state must also recognize the decisions of surro-
gate decisionmakers. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote sepa-
rately to point out that states have unquestioned authority to prevent suicide and that,
in his opinion, the federal courts and the Constitution do not address the subject. Id. at
2859, 2863 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 2864, 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is more than a liberty interest. Id. at 2865.
Rather, it is a fundamental right deserving examination at a heightened level of scru-
tiny. Id.
71. Id. at 2869.
72. Id. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
73. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2869. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text for
discussion of Nancy Cruzan's physical and mental condition. Justice Brennan observed
that:
Whatever a state's possible interests in mandating life support treatment under
other circumstances, there is no good to be obtained here by Missouri's insistence
that Nancy Cruzan remain on life-support systems if it is indeed her wish not to do
so...
. he State's general interest in life must accede to Nancy Cruzan's particu-
larized and intense interest in self-determination in her choice of medical treat-
ment. There is simply nothing legitimately within the State's purview to be gained
by superseding her decision.
Id. at 2869-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Justice Brennan found that the Missouri Supreme Court's
application of the "clear and convincing" standard created biased pro-
cedural obstacles which impermissibly burdened Cruzan's fundamental
right to die with dignity.74 While the majority acknowledged that a
patient's living will would meet the evidentiary standard, Justice Bren-
nan noted that it failed to specifically define what other types of evi-
dence it would find clear and convincing. 7" Finally, Justice Brennan
would have found the Missouri rule unconstitutional because it lessens
the likelihood of accurate determinations of the incompetent's
wishes.76
The majority's decision sustaining Missouri's adoption of a "clear
and convincing" evidentiary standard when determining the wishes of
an incompetent patient was incorrect. By deferring to the states," the
Court has allowed the states to institute heightened evidentiary stan-
dards that can operate as an obstacle to the execution of the incompe-
tent patient's true wishes.78 Thus, Cruzan illustrates the Court's belief
74. Id. at 2864. Justice Brennan noted the asymmetry in Missouri's evidentiary
standard by requiring clear proof of the patient's wishes to terminate life-sustaining
treatment on the one hand, and by not requiring any proof of the patient's wishes to
continue such medical treatment on the other. Id. at 2871.
75. Id. at 2874-75. Justice Brennan noted that "too few people execute living wills
or equivalently formal directives for such an evidentiary rule to ensure adequately that
the wishes of incompetent persons will be honored." Id. at 2875.
Even if Nancy Cruzan signed an instrument directing the withholding or withdrawal
of "death-prolonging procedures," Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Missouri Living Will
Statute) (1986) does not include the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition
or hydration. See infra note 63 for discussion of the Missouri Living Will Statute.
76. Id. at 2876. Justice Brennan stated that there is no reason to suppose that a
state is better suited to make the patient's choice than someone who knew the patient
intimately. Id. at 2877.
Justice Stevens also filed a dissent. In his dissent, Justice Stevens accepted the major-
ity's approval of Missouri's clear and convincing standard. Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Nevertheless, Justice Stevens would uphold the best interests of the patient
when supported by third party interests over any general state policy ignoring them. Id.
at 2889.
77. Although the Supreme Court approved the Missouri "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard, both the United States Supreme Court and the Missouri Supreme
Court failed to give explicit direction as to statements which would satisfy the require-
ment. The Missouri Living Will Statute specifically excludes artificial nutrition and
hydration from the life-sustaining procedures which a patient can prospectively refuse.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986). Therefore, both the courts and the legislature
have failed to create or describe a vehicle for a patient to overcome the procedural
obstacles to exercise the refusal of medical treatment.
78. 110 S. Ct. at 2873. See supra note 55 discussing the practical effect of the
heightened evidentiary standard.
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that states possess an unqualified interest in preserving life. 9
Justice Brennan, in contrast, correctly pointed out in his dissent that
Cruzan previously expressed her desire never to live as a "vegetable." 8"
Yet, because the Missouri Supreme Court feared the risk of an errone-
ous decision, it installed a safeguarding mechanism requiring "clear
and convincing" evidence,8 ' a standard perhaps insurmountable absent
a formal document of the patient's intentions.82 Similarly, Missouri's
living will statute does not allow a patient to direct withholding or
withdrawal from artificial nutrition and hydration. 3 Therefore, Mis-
souri has erected an evidentiary barrier prohibiting the removal of life-
sustaining treatment. In practical effect, this severe evidentiary stan-
dard takes away an individual's power to refuse medical treatment.
8 4
Unfortunately for Cruzan and other patients who live in a persistent
vegetative state, even evidence evincing their desire not to exist in this
condition will consistently fail to meet the "clear and convincing"
state-erected barrier.8 5 As a result, Nancy Cruzan could lie in the
same hospital bed completely oblivious to her surroundings for the
next thirty years.
8 6
Joe Start*
79. The Court discussed and approved a variety of state approaches and evidentiary
standards. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847-51. See supra notes 2, 26-59 and accompanying
texts for discussion of the state's latitude in the decision making process.
80. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863. See supra note 63 and accompanying text discussing
the pertinent evidence considered by the Court.
81. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
82. Id. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that the outcome may be
different if the patient appointed a proxy decision maker while competent. Id. at 2857
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She raised the possibility that a state may be constitution-
ally required to give effect to the patient's direction of a specific decision maker. Id. In
a footnote, the majority stated that the Cruzan opinion does not address this point,
leaving the door open for future litigation on this specific issue. Id. at 2856 n.12.
83. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986). See supra note 73 and accompanying text
discussing the Missouri Living Will Statute.
84. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text for discussion of individual rights.
85. See supra note 14 for discussion of Cruzan's expressed wishes.
86. See supra note 13 and accompanying text discussing Nancy Cruzan's prognosis.
Cruzan's family returned to state court in Missouri to seek a new trial based on new
evidence of Nancy's wishes regarding life-sustaining medical treatment. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 1990, at A12, col. 3. The State of Missouri, however, withdrew from the case,
having achieved its objective of clarifying the law on this issue. Id. Cruzan's guardian
is the only remaining party to have objected to the removal of Nancy's feeding tube. Id.
The guardian, however, sided with the family believing Cruzan's right to die should
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prevail. Id. On December 14, 1990, based upon a finding of clear and convincing evi-
dence, a county probate judge issued a ruling authorizing the Cruzan family to remove
Nancy's feeding tube. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 2. Subsequently, protestors
filed petitions in the Missouri Courts. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1990, at 10, col. 4. All
such petitions were denied. Id Thus, after an extended battle in court, Nancy Cruzan
will finally be allowed to die with dignity.
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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